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1 
Gramsci, the United Front Comintern and Democratic 
Strategy 
  Mark McNally 
Introduction 
Antonio Gramsci is rightly regarded as one of the most important Western Marxists of the 20th century. This is 
largely due to the work of scholars like Perry Anderson, Noberto Bobbio, Stuart Hall and Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. They returned to the history of 20th century Marxism in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to rediscover 
neglected intellectual currents, unsullied by the sins of Stalinism, which might still provide intellectual insights to 
radical socialist and democratic politics within and beyond the Marxist tradition.1 Gramsci’s Italian heritage – and 
critical interest in the work of Croce and Machiavelli – was obviously important here. But of equal significance was 
the fact that immediately prior to his imprisonment in 1926 by Mussolini’s fascist state, Gramsci had penned two 
important letters to the Comintern that were critical of the early phase of Stalinism and its attack on party 
democracy.2 For some at least, these letters represented a kind of parting of the ways between East and West within 
Marxism,3 and Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks emerge as one of the first great works of the Western Marxist tradition 
in its rejection of Eastern-style Marxism (and Stalinism in particular), and its development of a body of ideas 
tailored to the unique challenges of Western societies and their democratic culture. 
One of the most important aspects of this East/West distinction has undoubtedly turned on the issue of 
political strategy. Gramsci’s later writings in particular argue that a more democratic strategy would be required in 
the West than that which was employed in Russia in 1917. This strategy, while not rejecting a subsequent moment 
of revolutionary force, would be primarily characterized by an ideological battle to manufacture mass consent in 
civil society (a key dimension of the battle for ‘hegemony’). From very different perspectives, Anderson and Laclau 
and Mouffe acknowledged the ‘Eastern’ sources of this Gramscian reconfiguration of political strategy for the West. 
Laclau and Mouffe, for example, identify the emergence of the concept of hegemony itself (and its ‘logic of 
contingency’) as partly a consequence of the necessity of Lenin and the Bolsheviks to develop a political strategy of 
building democratic alliances in response to the uneven development of capitalism in Russia and the need to defeat 
  
and transcend Tsarism.4 Anderson, by contrast, points to the ‘Eastern’ origins of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony by 
relating its emergence to debates in Russian social democracy and the strategic coordinates of the United Front tactic 
devised by Comintern leaders in 1921–2.5 
In what follows in this chapter I pick up on Anderson’s second point in particular and explore further the 
Eastern sources of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and more specifically the democratic strategy embedded in it. I do 
this by carrying out a closer analysis of the relationship of Gramsci’s thought to the United Front Comintern than 
Anderson accomplished which, I maintain, is a relatively under-researched aspect of Gramsci’s thought.6 Drawing 
on recent Comintern scholarship, the chapter considers the United Front as chronologically and spatially a broader 
and more uneven political phenomenon in the 1920s than Anderson or Laclau and Mouffe have recognized. They, in 
fact, tend to regard the United Front as a relatively short affair that was quickly and emphatically overtaken by 
extensive ‘Bolshevization’ and ‘Stalinization’ of Comintern parties in the aftermath of Lenin’s death.7 I maintain, by 
contrast, that as a Comintern Representative in Moscow in 1922–3 at the height of the United Front and then as 
leader of the PCd’I (partito communista d’Italia) responsible for its implementation in Italy from 1924–6, Gramsci 
continued to engage in the politics of the United Front that had by no means been exhausted in this later period – at 
least not in Italy. In the above literature in general, Gramsci’s Western Marxism is rightly defined against the 
Stalinist ‘Third Period’ of the Comintern (1928–33), but the focus on ‘Bolshevization’ and ‘Stalinization’ leads to a 
certain neglect of the Comintern’s ‘second period’ (i.e. the period of stabilization and the United Front) and 
consequently obfuscates to some degree Gramsci’s full intellectual debt to the ‘Eastern’ leaders of the Third 
International in his later writings.8 Retrieving this Comintern intervention in Western democratic politics therefore 
not only complicates any crude distinction between East/West in terms of Marxist theory in the early 1920s but, as I 
will argue in the conclusion, foregrounds a dimension of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony – its democratic strategy – 
that explains to some extent the continuing interest in his work today and invites further exploration in the context of 
its critical appropriation in Laclau and Mouffe’s writings.9 
The United Front Comintern (1921–6) 
As is well known, Lenin and the leaders of the Russian Revolution established the Comintern (or Third 
International) in 1919 in a wave of revolutionary ardor that swept across Europe in the aftermath of the Bolshevik 
Revolution (1917).10 The Comintern, unlike its predecessor (the Second International), was established to be a truly 
  
revolutionary socialist movement committed to the violent overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of 
‘proletarian dictatorships’ across the world on the Bolshevik model. The famous ‘21 Points’ or ‘Conditions for 
Admission’ approved at its Second Congress (1920) thus ‘declared war on the whole bourgeois world and on all 
scab social democratic parties’ and demanded as its conditions of entry ‘a complete break with reformism and 
“centrist” politics’ and a commitment to ‘regularly and methodically remove reformists and centrists from every 
responsible post in the Labor movement.’11 This dogmatically sectarian political strategy was orientated by an 
overly optimistic Marxist–Leninist theory of crisis and a stagist account of economic history that displayed an ill-
founded confidence that ‘moribund capitalism’ was in terminal decline and a worldwide proletarian revolution was 
imminent and inevitable.12 
By mid-1921, however, the certainty of capitalist collapse and proletarian revolution was rapidly ebbing. 
Revolutionary actions in Hungary (1919), Italy (1919–20) and Germany (1921) in these early years of the 
Comintern all ended in failure as the working masses declined to rally to the revolutionary call.– The Comintern was 
in the end forced to acknowledge that in the West at least the masses remained wedded to the pacifist and 
parliamentary traditions of social democracy.13 It was in this context that the United Front strategy gradually 
emerged in 1921–2 as a call to communist parties to transform themselves into mass-based popular movements. At 
the Third Congress, in July 1921, the Comintern thus adopted the slogan ‘To the Masses.’14 This signaled that the 
era of blind confidence in revolutionary theory and the historical process delivering the people into their ranks had 
ended, and with it of course went any attempt to define communist strategy as one of pursuing power by an 
audacious strike on the state by a small, disciplined vanguard party – as some at least read the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Such ‘leftist deviations’ were now rarely tolerated and the United Front was in fact as much a campaign against 
intransigent elements within the ranks of the Comintern, who clung to them, as it was a colossal effort to win over 
the masses from social democracy and other popular forces.15 
As is well known, the strategy was riven with contradictions and inconsistencies from the outset and 
achieved only partial successes. At times the United Front was presented as a direct appeal for joint action to 
reformist leaders (‘the United Front from above’); on other occasions the Comintern dogmatically insisted that the 
appeal was only to be made to the reformist masses (‘the United Front from below’); and in yet another 
configuration it was sometimes defined as incorporating both approaches simultaneously (‘the United Front from 
  
above and below’).16 Despite these inconsistencies, the United Front had, nonetheless, a number of important and 
relatively consistent strategic coordinates aimed at winning the masses that Gramsci would inherit and elaborate on. 
First, United Front tactics demanded a careful and realistic analysis by all parties of the balance of popular 
forces and, in particular, the mass capacities of communist parties vis-à-vis their opponents. In October 1922, 
Trotsky bluntly pointed out that revolutionary socialist movements ‘rest directly only upon a fraction of the working 
class’ and the task of communist parties was accordingly to ‘win the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the 
working class.’17 Crucially, it was this democratic deficit in the West that first placed mass tactics and strategy at 
center stage in Comintern circles. 
Second, the United Front emphasized the necessity for tactical short-term alliances as a means to reach the 
social democratic and wider popular masses. At the core of this approach was accordingly a strategic maneuver to 
call on social democrats in particular to engage in ‘joint actions’ for the ‘partial demands’ of the workers.18 The aim 
of the Comintern was not, of course, organizational unity, but rather to mount a rearguard action that would 
disaggregate oppositional popular movements, detaching their base from the leadership by persuading the mass 
membership of the validity of communist ideology and tactics.19 The Bolsheviks’ success was accordingly reframed 
as no longer due to an audacious ‘frontal assault’ in October 1917, but rather to their ability to employ tactics of 
flexibility, compromise and political maneuver over a longer period before the seizure of power. As Bukharin 
became a more important figure in the Comintern in 1923–6, and with the success of NEP (New Economic Policy) 
in Russia, the strategy of the United Front was supplemented with NEP themes and especially the alliance with the 
peasantry and sections of the rural and urban middle classes.20 As early as the Third Congress, Comintern leaders 
were thus alerting communists to the importance of these ‘intermediary forces’ in the West – the peasantry, the 
urban petit-bourgeoisie, technicians, white-collar workers and the intelligentsia – who were being ‘drawn into the 
struggle between revolution and counter-revolution’ and could ‘assist the proletarian dictatorship in the period of 
transition from capitalism to Communism by helping with the problems of state and economic administration.’21 By 
the Fourth Comintern Congress (1922), Bukharin was in fact claiming that the lessons of the worker–peasant 
alliance in Russia (the smycka) and its historic compromise with the peasantry under NEP were of ‘general 
applicability’ and ‘the solution of a broad organizational and social problem.’22 At the Fifth Congress (1924), this 
broadening of the popular reach of the United Front continued, as illustrated by the transformation of its slogan of 
  
‘the Workers Government’ to ‘the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government’, described tellingly as ‘a deduction from 
the united front tactics.’23  
Third, the United Front revived Lenin’s earlier theme of proletarian ‘leadership’ in a bloc of anti-Tsarist 
forces,24 applying it now to the West, and the need for a new kind of leadership in an alliance of anti-capitalist 
forces. The Party’s task was therefore ‘to lead the immediate struggles of the working masses for their most vital 
interests,’ taking the initiative in the fight for better wages, working and living conditions, and demonstrating that 
the communists were the most vital and committed force to pursue these.25 It was assumed, in fact, that in these joint 
actions a point would be reached when the reformist leadership would refuse to take the battle to open confrontation 
with capitalism. In these circumstances communists would expose their lack of resolve to their mass base who – it 
was thought – would then swarm into the ranks of the unwavering communists.26 This emphasis on leadership was 
also applied beyond the proletariat to the peasantry and the rural and urban lower middle classes. At the Fourth 
Congress (1922) – which Gramsci attended as a PCd’I Representative – Zinoviev thus insisted on the need for 
workers ‘to lead all oppressed layers in the struggle against the bourgeoisie.’27 
Finally, since United Front tactics involved making alliances with non-revolutionary forces, great weight 
was placed on the need for communist parties to preserve their revolutionary principles and maintain their 
‘autonomy’ in any bloc formed.28 Indeed, it was this concern that initially instigated the campaign of Bolshevization 
in the aftermath of the abortive German Revolution of 1923 – the so-called ‘German October’ – in which the KPD 
(German Communist Party) was accused of placing too much faith in the degenerate leaders of ‘social democracy.’29 
Bolshevization, with its emphasis on greater centralization and ideological homogeneity, would eventually provide 
the pretense for the Russification and Stalinization of the Comintern in the mid- to late 1920s. But it is important to 
recognize that at the outset, in 1924–6, this was an uneven process that largely depended on whether the Comintern 
saw the danger from the ‘Right’ (who supposedly had flirted with more substantial alliances with the reformists), or 
the radical ‘Left’ (who sought to return to the surer ideological world of the vanguardism and political isolationism 
of the 21 Points).30 Crucially, in the Italian context, it was the Left, led by Amadeo Bordiga, which presented the 
greater danger, and it was the task of Antonio Gramsci as PCd’I leader to confront this political challenge up to 
1926. Indeed, this political challenge not only shaped Gramsci’s immediate pre-prison writings, but also his project 
in the Prison Notebooks where the United Front is critically appropriated and Gramsci thinks through how 
  
revolutionary socialism can elaborate a democratic strategy to achieve hegemony in the complex political, economic 
and ideological arenas of modern Western democracies. 
The United Front and Gramsci’s ‘Relations of Force’ 
The United Front, as we have seen, involved a turn toward careful analysis of popular politics, not only the popular 
solidity of communist parties, but also social democratic parties and unions and a broad array of ‘intermediate 
forces.’ This aspect of United Front tactics clearly informed Gramsci’s development of a mode of social analysis in 
the Prison Notebooks centered on his concept of ‘relations of force.’ In his pre-prison writings Gramsci had indeed 
already begun to analyze the ‘relations of force’ in Italy guided by United Front tactics. In 1926 he wrote: 
For all the capitalist countries, a fundamental problem is posed – the problem of the transition from the 
united front tactic, understood in a general sense, to a specific tactic which confronts the concrete problems 
of national life and operates on the basis of the popular forces as they are historically determined.31 
This problematic would provide a rich seam for a broader and deeper exploration of the plurality and historical 
configuration of popular political forces in the Italian political arena in the Prison Notebooks. But in his pre-prison 
writings Gramsci tended to theorize these as a consequence of Italy’s backward and uneven economic development. 
In ‘peripheral states’ he thus maintained ‘a broad stratum of intermediate classes stretches between the proletariat 
and capitalism: classes which seek to carry on, and to a certain sense succeed in carrying on, policies of their own, 
with ideologies which often influence broad strata of the proletariat, but which particularly affect the peasant 
masses.’32 The analysis moreover was clearly aimed at democratic results and historically grounded. ‘Particular 
attention,’ Gramsci thus maintained, ‘must be accorded to the groups and parties that have a mass base. . . among the 
agricultural population of the South and islands.’33 
This mode of analysis was taken up again in the Prison Notebooks in a much more diverse and generalized 
manner in some of Gramsci’s most important notes on ‘Relations between Structure and Superstructures’ and the 
theorization of hegemony which it underpinned. In Notebook 4 in particular Gramsci extended this analysis of the 
‘relations of forces’ under three categories: the ‘relation of social forces’ (classes); ‘the political “relation of forces”’ 
and the ‘relation of military forces.’ The second set of relations is crucial for Gramsci since it is at this level – ‘the 
most patently “political” phase’ – that one leading group’s ideology ‘tends to prevail, to dominate, to spread across 
the entire field, bringing about, in addition to economic and political unity, intellectual and moral unity, not on a 
  
corporate but on a universal level: the hegemony of a fundamental social group over the subordinate groups.’34 
While the marks of the Comintern’s call to evaluate and study carefully the balance of popular forces as a crucial 
preparation for revolutionary strategy are clearly visible here, there is no doubt too that Gramsci broadened its 
parameters extensively and in the process extended his conception of politics to give ideological struggle a much 
more central status. Leadership, or hegemony in Gramsci’s terms, now required careful analysis of all historically 
grounded political and ideological elements with the aim of molding a form of ‘intellectual and moral unity’ around 
‘a fundamental social group.’ This was above all the task of the leading group’s political party and here again the 
coordinates of United Front strategy were important for Gramsci.  
The United Front and Gramsci’s ‘Modern Prince’ 
As we have seen, by 1924, after some initial resistance, Gramsci had in fact come to share the United Front 
Comintern’s view that a major obstacle to mass politics in its ranks was the excessively ‘vanguardist’ Party 
organizational principles pursued by Comintern ‘Lefts.’ This was particularly important in the Italian context where 
one of its leading lights, Amadeo Bordiga, as leader of the PCd’I from 1920–3 had organized the Italian Party as a 
closed, centralized and highly disciplined revolutionary movement in line with the 21 Points.35 In the debates on the 
United Front within the Italian Party, Bordiga defended vigorously his conception of the Party as a small 
revolutionary elite united by its iron discipline and unbending commitment to revolutionary Marxist theory. The 
United Front’s ‘politicking,’ he maintained, would bring about the degeneration of the Party into ‘opportunistic 
labourism’ as untrustworthy elements entered its ranks and corrupted its revolutionary principles.36 This conception 
of the Party was roundly criticized by the United Front Comintern, including the Bukharinist Comintern 
Representative to Italy, Jules Humbert-Droz. He left the PCd’I in no doubt during his period in Italy in 1924 that its 
rigid, hierarchical Party structure, developed under the leadership of Bordiga – and initially preserved under 
Gramsci – was hopelessly inadequate for the United Front’s mass political action. In a letter to Zinoviev in April 
1924, Humbert-Droz roundly condemned the PCd’I Executive for failing to implement United Front tactics. He 
complained in particular of lack of mass initiative, reporting that ‘The electoral period was not at all used as it 
should have been to gain public support for the Party’ as the PCd’I was ‘too absorbed in its own internal disputes to 
return to the arena of public life.’ To remedy this situation, Humbert-Droz demanded ‘more frequent meetings of the 
party executive in which questions of general politics and the tactics of the party were on the agenda.’37 It is notable 
  
that by September of the same year, as Gramsci’s leadership of the PCd’I consolidated, he was reporting significant 
improvements in the application of United Front tactics: 
The work among the peasantry has already begun with zeal and is producing notable results. . . . We must 
not forget that just four months ago the Party was completely absorbed in its own internal struggles and 
completely illegal. . . . I have managed to convince myself of the constant effort of the Secretariat to 
stimulate initiative in the battle against sectarianism and to lead the Party on to our terrain.38 
The traces of these strategic coordinates of the United Front tactics, endorsed by Bukharin and Humbert-Droz in 
particular in this period, are clearly visible in the Prison Notebooks, and especially in Gramsci’s account of the 
revolutionary party (‘the Modern Prince’). 
In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci in fact returns to Bordiga’s elitist and ‘pseudo-aristocratic’ approach to 
party organization, condemning it as yet another contribution to ‘the apoliticism and passivity of the great popular 
masses’ that had long plagued progressive politics in Italy.39 ‘“Vanguards” without armies to back them up’ are 
accordingly contrasted unfavorably by Gramsci to a political strategy in which the party’s intellectuals ‘are 
conscious of being linked organically to a national-popular mass . . . and stimulate the formation of homogenous, 
compact social blocs, which will give birth to their own intellectuals.’40 For Gramsci, then, if parties are to develop 
the capacity to win and lead the masses they must develop an organizational structure characterized by multiple 
strata of intellectuals of different grades and specializations with the possibility of upward mobility. Crucially, this is 
what would ensure their capacity to forge organic links with the masses in civil society.41 
It was of course the absence of this ‘organic’ link with the urban and rural masses manifested in the failed 
revolutionary surges of the early 1920s and in Bordiga’s PCd’I which had inspired the United Front strategy in the 
first place. Taking up this problem of a democratic deficit, Gramsci gives special attention to the party’s 
development of a mass ideological strategy. In particular, he attacks vociferously ideological orientations based on 
narrow class sectarianism (‘economic-corporatism’) typical of the Left which he identifies as characteristic of 
primitive or declining political formations. This approach is toxic to any possibility of victory among the masses 
since it involves a form of dogmatic guardianship of class and revolutionary principles and values – induced by the 
experience of social democracy’s descent into class collaboration – which ultimately isolates the Party from the 
masses organized in popular political movements (including social democratic parties and unions) and wider civil 
  
society associations.42 In fact, from this perspective, adversarial leaders and the masses are treated en bloc as 
ideological enemies who must be defeated, not assimilated, since their integration necessarily leads to the corruption 
of communist principles. 
In answer to this vanguardist account of party ideology modeled on the 21 Points, Gramsci insists that ‘the 
proletariat, in order to become capable as a class of governing, must strip itself of every residue of corporatism, 
every syndicalist prejudice and incrustation.’43 Ideological struggle, moreover, should not be reduced to pocket-book 
recitals of Marxist–Leninist revolutionary principles or rigid sectarian accounts of laws of economic history that 
paint all opponents as petit-bourgeois and reformist ‘dupes.’44 The Party must rather adopt a creative and 
constructive approach to ideological struggle that involves finding the right language and slogans that will mobilize 
and create organic links with a concrete historically determined mass. But, in line with the United Front’s emphasis 
on fundamental principles and autonomy of action, Gramsci is nonetheless careful to insist that there are clear limits 
to this constructive act, since sacrifices and compromise in ideological terms ‘cannot touch the essential.’45 
In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci extends the boundaries of the strategic coordinates of the United Front in 
relation to party ideology, suggesting in fact that its ideology must develop reciprocally and dialectically with the 
national-popular elements it seeks to win over and become embedded in the consciousness and praxis of the masses. 
For Gramsci, this process of ‘nationalizing’ and democratizing the party’s ideology is a process which can be 
characterized as transforming the ‘common sense’ of the masses (its largely incoherent and spontaneous ‘traditional 
conception of the world’) into a form of ‘good sense’ in which the ‘philosophy of praxis’ (i.e. Marxism) is ‘diffused 
in such a way as to convert itself into an active norm of conduct’46 and in fact becomes ‘rooted in the popular 
consciousness with the same solidity and imperative quality as traditional beliefs.’47 Leaving aside for the moment 
the possibility of contradiction and conflicts of values in this new ideological synthesis which I return to below, its 
strategic democratic element is nonetheless clear as what Gramsci is committing the Party to in this move to 
mobilize the masses is an abandonment of revolutionary purism and a commitment to articulate Marxism to 
‘extraneous’ national-popular ideological elements that are historically embedded in the political terrain it is 
attempting to hegemonize. 
It is also crucial for Gramsci that the Party relates this attempt to achieve ‘intellectual and moral reform’ to 
concrete political action and especially ‘a programme of economic reform.’ Indeed, he argues ‘the programme of 
  
economic reform is the concrete way in which every intellectual and moral reform expresses itself.’48 For Gramsci 
this political manifestation of the ideological struggle takes two forms that recall United Front tactics. First, it 
involves engaged participation and leadership in political campaigns and direct action launched in cooperation with 
the urban and rural masses for immediate demands. Second, it requires the incorporation of these demands into a 
coherent party programme for government. In his intervention at the PCd’I’s Como Conference on his return from 
Comintern duties, Gramsci thus defended openly for the first time the United Front slogan of the ‘Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Government’ launched at the Fifth Congress in precisely these terms arguing that they were crucial to win 
over in particular the rural masses in Italy’s Mezzogiorno: 
it is necessary to win over these masses, and this can be done only by participating in the struggles which 
they launch for partial victories and partial demands. The ‘workers’ and peasants’ government’ slogan must 
serve to bring together and synthesize the content of these partial struggles, in a programme which can be 
understood even by the most backward masses.49 
This was a theme which Gramsci returned to in the Prison Notebooks in his important consideration of the failure of 
the radical bourgeois party in the Italian Risorgimento (the Action Party) to take leadership of the national 
reawakening from the more ‘reactionary’ yet tactically astute Moderate Party and thereby give the Italian State a 
sounder political base among the masses. For the Action Party ‘to have succeeded at the very least in stamping the 
movement of the Risorgimento with a more markedly popular and democratic character,’ Gramsci therefore argues, 
‘it would have had to counterpoise to the “empirical” activity of the Moderates . . . an organic programme of 
government which would reflect the essential demands of the popular masses, and in the first place of the 
peasantry.’50 In an obvious reference to the Comintern’s difficulties in pursuing a similar strategy in the 1920s in the 
face of Leftist charges of class compromise and a descent into reformism, Gramsci identifies this democratic 
strategy as a form of positive ‘Jacobinism’ to be contrasted to a negative version of the same concept. The 
‘constructive’ approach of ‘having made the demands of the popular masses one’s own’ is thus to be privileged over 
a regressive ‘destructive’ Jacobinism that ‘derived from hatred of rivals and enemies . . . the sectarian element of the 
clique, of the small group, of unrestrained individualism, more than the national political element.’51 
  
The United Front and Gramsci’s Democratic strategy 
While the Comintern’s conception of the Party leading a ‘United Front’ of popular forces is one of the key points of 
departure for Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, it is the manner in which Gramsci marries his interests in democratic 
politics (winning over the masses) to ideological strategy that distinguishes his approach and gives it continuing 
resonance today. In fact, this leads to an extraordinary radicalization and extension of the conceptions of 
‘leadership’ and ‘alliance-building’ in Gramsci’s later writings that provides us with a new vision of democratic 
politics aimed at constructing and maintaining organic bonds with the working masses and a range of other 
historically constituted popular forces in civil society. Indeed, for Gramsci only organic bonds of this nature provide 
solid and enduring ‘state’ power, understood in the Gramscian sense, as ‘State = political society + civil society’.52 
An examination of the democratic strategy incorporated into Gramsci’s account of hegemony not only reveals its 
debt to the Comintern’s United Front but, again, its elaboration into a more strategically sophisticated, democratic 
and pluralistic account of politics. 
In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci in fact identifies the United Front with Lenin’s abandonment of the failed 
leftist strategy of ‘war of manoeuvre’ (frontal assault) for a new strategy of a ‘war of position’: 
It seems to me that Ilitch understood that a change was necessary from the war of manoeuvre applied 
victoriously in the East in 1917, to a war of position which was the only form possible in the West. . . . This 
is what the formula of the ‘United Front’ seems to me to mean. . . .53 
In a move that was typical of Comintern discourse in the wake of Lenin’s death, Gramsci in fact identifies ‘the war 
of position’ and hegemony itself as ‘Leninist’ innovations.54 More importantly, he clearly links the necessity to 
conduct politics in this manner as a consequence of the age of democratic states in the West: 
The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of 
associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent 
fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely ‘partial’ the element of movement 
which before used to be ‘the whole’ of war, etc.55 
The echoes of the United Front strategy to abandon frontal assaults and embark on a great ideological campaign to 
win over the masses in the West are evident. However, for Gramsci parties that aim to acquire state power in the 
modern democracies must first adopt a strategy to establish ‘trenches’ and ‘fortifications’ for that power. This was a 
  
radical step beyond the United Front as it implied more robust and enduring relations with other subaltern classes 
and associations that would form ‘a complex of associations in civil society.’ 
Gramsci also takes up the United Front conception of leadership in his theory of hegemony, marrying it to a 
more sophisticated account of the relations of force and a broader and deeper conception of a democratic alliance. 
He thus begins with the United Front necessity for autonomy of action, insisting that leadership and hegemony 
develop dialectically and the point of departure must include a determination of the Party not to resign itself to 
‘auxiliary’ status. It was for this reason he resolutely rejected Pierro Sraffa’s call in 1924 for the PCd’I to simply 
support the ‘democratic opposition’ to fascism as a move that would consign the communists to subalternity and 
ultimately ‘liquidation.’56 In the Prison Notebooks he insists that hegemony requires a party to take the initiative in 
the event of political crises and dislocations in the oppositional bloc; to get to the head of them and turn them to 
their ideological advantage by extending their allies, popular influence and building consent for their ideological 
goals. In this endeavor, studies of the relations of force are consequently not ‘ends in themselves’ but always aimed 
at 
the permanently organized force that can be pushed forward when the situation is propitious (collapse of 
the enemy, crises, etc.). The essential task is to work systematically to form, develop, and enlarge this force 
and to make it ever more homogenous, compact, and self-aware. . . .57 
For Gramsci this ‘forward movement’ was a political and ideological struggle that must be strategically calibrated 
for success. It could not therefore take the form of a dogmatic adherence to principle on the political issues of the 
day, but rather must be approached as a series of ‘points of departure,’58 aimed at expanding and consolidating one’s 
own forces through compromise in the initial stages, while simultaneously forging a deeper consent for the 
ideological goals of the movement in the long term. 
Part and parcel of every hegemonic strategy of this nature is thus the ‘molecular’ building of a series of 
democratic relations with allies that also sets out in the process to disintegrate and disaggregate opposition parties 
and movements and their alliance of forces. This of course was orientated by the United Front’s call for ‘a rearguard 
action’ against primarily social democracy that distinguishes the proletarian and peasant masses from both their 
reformist and petit-bourgeois leadership, aiming to win them over to Comintern parties. In a letter to Togliatti in 
  
1923 in which he sought to convince his comrade of the impotency of polemical ‘frontal assaults’ on reformists and 
the strategic efficacy of the United Front, Gramsci thus argued: 
Three years’ experience has taught us, not just in Italy, how deeply-rooted social-democratic traditions are, 
and how difficult it is to destroy the residues of the past through ideological polemics. An immense and at 
the same time painstaking political action is necessary, that can break down this tradition day by day, by 
breaking down the organism which embodies it. 
In order to achieve this Gramsci maintained the party ‘must not continue to make en bloc counterpositions, but must 
distinguish between leaders and mass base’ and ‘find all the elements of disagreement between the leaders and the 
mass base and deepen these, enlarge them, generalize them politically.’59 
In a clear reformulation of the United Front, Gramsci already was arguing in 1926 that as far as direct 
political opponents such as social democrats and popular peasant parties are concerned, the manner in which the 
process of disintegration–reintegration (the ‘war of position’) operates hinges on the ability of the Party’s organic 
intellectuals to win over not the central leadership of these opposition movements (an unrealistic adventure), or in 
the first instance the mass base, but rather their ‘intermediate stratum’ which ‘maintains the link between the leading 
group at the top, and the mass of members and those influenced by the party.’60 This approach was again to be 
generalized in the Prison Notebooks,61 but it first emerged as a reflection on the relative success of the PCd’I’s 
application of United Front tactics in 1926.62 It was not sufficient, however, to win over middle-ranking strata of 
intellectuals in opposing - yet socially - contiguous parties since hegemony assumed a much broader leadership 
across political and civil society. Thus Gramsci maintained that hegemonic parties must also aim to assimilate 
‘traditional intellectuals,’ that is to say, intellectuals who have no ‘organic’ relationship to any social class or party 
and who ‘put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group.’ While this 
autonomy for Gramsci is ultimately spurious, he is acutely aware that their abandonment of the old political order 
for compliance (or passive consent) with a new order is a vital step in gaining the confidence and support of the 
wider masses. According to Gramsci then, ‘One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing 
towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals.’63 This is 
the task of the political party which ‘is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given group – 
the dominant one – and the traditional intellectuals.’64 At times he suggests in the Notebooks that some categories of 
  
traditional intellectuals were initially formed as the organic intellectuals of classes that had since been superseded 
(clerics were, for example, the organic intellectuals of the feudal order),65 but for Gramsci what was strategically 
important was to forge relationships with and ideologically influence those traditional intellectuals who retained a 
strong ‘national-popular’ character. This meant above all those intellectuals who held influence over the rural 
workers and petit-bourgeoisie since they made up the large majority of the population in many European states, 
including Italy, at the time. 
However, a democratic strategy of this character which placed the Party at the hub of a mass ‘complex of 
associations in civil society’ mediated through networks of ‘intellectuals’ inevitably presented Gramsci with new 
strategic challenges that the Comintern’s narrower approach had not envisaged. Foremost among these was how to 
maintain unity in this more diverse and pluralized political formation, and, above all, to avoid internecine conflict 
which would of course open up the possibility of disintegrative processes that could be exploited by opposition 
forces. In an effort to resolve this tension in his thought and resolve this strategic necessity, Gramsci drew heavily 
on the language of balance and equilibrium, using them to develop his account of hegemony and ideological 
struggle.66 In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci in fact conceives of the unity achieved in such a bloc of forces as a kind 
of equilibrium: 
the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor 
force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the ‘national’ energies. In other words, the dominant 
group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State 
is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria.67 
Indeed, leadership now required that the Party carried out a ‘balancing function’ in which it not only ‘balances the 
various interests struggling against the predominant (but not absolutely exclusivist) interest,’ but also takes 
responsibility for ‘holding the balance between the various interests in “civil society.”’ This ‘hegemonic function’68 
went beyond a simple compromise of interests since for Gramsci it required a form of unity at the level of ideology 
to transform and assimilate new elements to the bloc and to thwart disintegrative tendencies. 
It was in this dual balancing function of checking disintegrative tendencies and staving off competition 
where Gramsci’s account of hegemony and democratic strategy is most innovative, moving well beyond the 
Comintern’s United Front. For Gramsci now offers in the Prison Notebooks two tantalizing suggestions of how 
  
destabilization at the mass base are to be checked and the danger of the siphoning of support avoided. Education and 
criticism of disintegrative elements in the bloc were the key ‘checking’ mechanisms that were vital for the 
establishment of a dynamic equilibrium for Gramsci. The task then of ‘the first representatives of the new historical 
phase’ is to perform a ‘criticism’ of these elements that ‘results in a process of differentiation and of change in the 
relative weight that the adherents of the old ideologies used to possess.’ This was not simply a matter of ‘checking’ 
elements that had previously been allied to capitalism, but bonding them to the center by persuading them of the 
legitimacy of the core ideology in the bloc. This would lead to a situation in which ‘what was once considered 
secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, comes to be seen as primary and becomes the nucleus of a new 
ideological and theoretical complex.’69 For the ‘historical act’ of revolution, Gramsci argues, ‘can only be performed 
by a “collective man” which presupposes ‘the attainment of a “cultural–social” unity through which a multiplicity of 
dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and 
common conception of the world, both general and particular.’70 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the Comintern’s United Front provided Gramsci with the rudimentary elements of 
an important dimension of his theory of hegemony in its first attempt to develop a democratic strategy for the West 
and especially the defeat of social democracy. While this does not amount to a rejection of Gramsci’s status as a 
Western Marxist, it does require that we acknowledge at least that a vital aspect of his theory of hegemony had 
important Eastern roots in that it was predominantly the leaders of the Russian Revolution – Lenin, Bukharin, 
Trotsky and Zinoviev – who played the central role in devising this strategy. The Comintern’s turn away from 
democratic politics in 1926–8 with the emergence of Stalinization – in its so-called ‘Third Period’ – ultimately 
brought the experiment in attempting to win over the masses to an end both in Russia and internationally when force 
and an unyielding demand for complete subordination to the Russian leader in domestic and foreign policy became 
all-pervasive. In studies of Gramsci and the Comintern, it seems to me at least that the shadow cast by Stalinism has 
fallen backward as well as forward, obscuring to some extent Gramsci’s intellectual debt to the Third International. 
This debt, though inadequately acknowledged, was not moreover an insignificant one if we turn to consider 
the enduring relevance of Gramsci’s thought today. Gramsci’s hegemony continues to incite interest among modern-
day political and social theorists – as well as political movements of both the Left and Right – precisely because 
  
many who read his work recognize that the democratic strategy at the heart of his theory is pregnant with empirical 
and normative insights for the study and practice of democratic politics. With a critical appropriation such insights 
can of course acquire a more general application to politics that need not be conducted within the strictly 
revolutionary Marxist framework of analysis that Gramsci employed.71 This of course was the central preoccupation 
of the post-Marxist and pioneering radical democratic theory of Laclau and Mouffe whose work stands out as the 
most successful attempt to date to critically elaborate the democratic strategy at the heart of Gramsci’s hegemony. 
Laclau and Mouffe, however, reconstructed Gramsci’s hegemony within a poststructuralist and Lacanian paradigm 
that developed over the years in ways which are distant from Gramsci’s original strategy – a development of course 
they never sought to conceal. Criticisms of their work have tended to focus on their abandoning of Marxist 
categories and the critique of capitalism.72 However, from this perspective it is the question of democratic agency 
which seems more problematic in their approach, since – in line with the wider ontological assumptions of the post 
structuralist tradition in their theorization of hegemony – they de-center, hollow out and destabilize subjectivity so 
the subject ends up precariously trapped between the Scylla and Charybdis of radical contingency and a 
structuration divested of all agency.73 This calls into question the emergence of any hegemonic subject sufficiently 
stable and unified to lead the rest of society. In Gramsci, by contrast, democratic leadership is centered on parties 
which are closely aligned with historically constituted social forces whose ideology has passed from ‘the economic-
corporate’ to ‘the universal’ plane which is what allows them to exercise the crucial unifying and mediating role 
between political society and civil society at large. As noted above, managing the resulting tensions and sustaining a 
dynamic equilibrium in a bloc of this nature is part and parcel of hegemonic agency and democratic politics for 
Gramsci.74 Indeed, it is arguable that a return to the letter and context of Gramsci’s thought and particularly his 
illuminating conceptions of balance and equilibrium – which this chapter has sought to explore to some extent – can 
still help us think through this problem of agency in relation to democratic strategy. For while Gramsci cannot of 
course provide us with ready-made answers to modern-day problems, it might be nonetheless that his profound 
understanding of the difficult yet surmountable challenge for political parties to balance the pursuit of core 
ideological goals with the demands of winning over a broad diversified mass in conditions of modern democracy – a 
charge which he first acquired through the Comintern’s United Front – can still teach us something about how 
democratic politics is and should be conducted today. 
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